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PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL MERIT RETENTION IN FLORIDA 
Scott G. Hawkins

 
Abstract 
 This November, voters will decide whether to retain in office three 
justices of the Florida Supreme Court and fifteen judges of the district 
courts of appeal. This Essay explains the merit retention process and puts 
that process in historical context. It analyzes the challenges voters face in 
making decisions about whether to retain appellate court judges and 
highlights The Florida Bar’s role in educating voters about merit retention. 
The Florida constitution entrusts the important decision whether to retain 
appellate court judges, including supreme court justices, to the voters, and 
in order to make that decision, voters must be informed about the judicial 
role in American democracy. 
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“[T]he greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an 
ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a 
dependent Judiciary.” 
—Chief Justice John Marshall1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the history of judicial retention elections, the November 2012 
general election in Florida will be significant. Voters will decide whether 
to retain three sitting justices of the Florida Supreme Court and fifteen 
sitting judges on Florida’s appellate courts.2 The central question for voters 
is whether these judges merit retention. Stated differently, voters will 
decide whether the records and reputations of these judicial officers merit 
their continuation in judicial office. 
While the concept of judicial merit retention is not new in American 
government,
3
 it appears there is fundamental voter misunderstanding on 
the subject. Focus group research conducted on behalf of The Florida Bar 
indicates that 90% of the participating voters do not understand what the 
term ―judicial merit retention‖ means.4 This apparent lack of understanding 
is disturbing given both the importance of the vote (whether to retain in 
office sitting constitutional officers—appellate judges and supreme court 
justices) and the breadth of judicial merit retention. Under the Florida 
constitution, merit retention elections are the sole mechanism for 
determining whether Florida Supreme Court justices and other appellate 
court judges should continue to serve in judicial office.
5
 
                                                                                                                     
 1. John Marshall, Speech on Dec. 11, 1829, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA 
STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–30 619 (1830). 
 2. See The Vote‟s in Your Court: Judicial Merit Retention. Know the Facts., THE FLA. BAR, 
http://www.floridabar.org/thevotesinyourcourt (last visited July 5, 2012) [hereinafter The Vote‟s in 
Your Court] (listing supreme court justices and appellate judges up for merit retention). 
 3. A system of merit selection and retention for judges at all levels was first implemented in 
Missouri. See Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri‟s Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1941 to 2005, 72 MO. 
L. REV. 199, 200–02 (2007). Hence, states which have a form of judicial merit selection and 
retention are said to have adopted the ―Missouri Plan.‖ 
 4. Moore Consulting Grp., The Florida Bar Merit Retention Education Program 4 (2012) 
(on file with author) (describing results of focus group research). By way of comparison, studies 
from other states have found low levels of voter information with respect to judicial elections. See, 
e.g., Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Retention 
Elections for Supreme Court Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68, 72 (1983) (reporting that 
over 50% of voters had ―no information‖ about justices on the ballot); Charles H. Sheldon & 
Nicholas P. Lovrich Jr., Voter Knowledge, Behavior and Attitudes in Primary and General Judicial 
Elections, 82 JUDICATURE 216, 218 tbl.1 (1999) (showing that more than 75% of voters had ―no 
information‖ or ―not enough information‖ about judicial candidates). 
 5. This analysis does not include disciplining of judges by the Judicial Qualifications 
Commission (JQC). Unlike a merit retention vote, the focus in a proceeding before the JQC is 
whether the subject judicial officer violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Discipline of judicial 
officers may include censure, reprimand, or removal from office. See generally Hon. James R. 
2
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The Florida Bar appreciates the opportunity to participate in this 
discussion. Like state bars across the country, The Florida Bar has as a core 
mission to ―improve the administration of justice.‖6 In keeping with this 
mission and the longstanding commitment of The Florida Bar to encourage 
voter education, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar initiated an 
education program with the goal of enhancing voter understanding of 
judicial merit retention in connection with the general election in 
November 2012.
7
 In this regard, considerable effort has been expended to 
educate voters about Florida’s merit retention system, including an 
examination of the system that immediately predated the 1976 
constitutional referendum that implemented the current system. 
This Essay puts merit retention in context and discusses The Florida 
Bar’s efforts to educate Florida voters about merit retention. Part I outlines 
how merit retention works and charts the history of judicial selection in 
Florida. Part II explains the judicial reforms that led to the current system 
in the early 1970s. Part III analyzes some of the challenges voters face as 
they make important decisions about whether to retain judges. Finally, Part 
IV highlights the Bar’s role in educating voters about merit retention. 
I.  OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Overview of Merit Retention Elections in Florida 
In contrast to the selection, appointment, and retention of judges in the 
federal system, the Florida constitution provides voters with a direct role in 
determining whether appellate court judges and supreme court justices 
should be retained to continue serving the state.
8
 The current system has 
been in place since 1976 as the result of a constitutional referendum to 
institute a merit retention system designed to provide Florida citizens with 
an opportunity to vote, in nonpartisan elections, on the merits of sitting 
state appellate court judges and justices of the Florida Supreme Court. The 
referendum to amend the Florida constitution in this manner passed by a 
substantial majority.
9
  
                                                                                                                     
Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of Misconduct, 30 NOVA L. REV. 349 (2006). This 
topic is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 6. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 1-2 (―The purpose of The Florida Bar shall 
be to inculcate in its members the principles of duty and service to the public, to improve the 
administration of justice, and to advance the science of jurisprudence.‖). 
 7. See The Vote‟s in Your Court, supra note 2. 
 8. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing for presidential appointment of federal judges 
―by and with the advice and consent of the Senate‖), and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal 
judges tenure ―during good behaviour‖), with FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (requiring retention elections 
for state supreme court justices and appellate judges). 
 9. See Martin Dyckman, Merit Retention Passes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3, 1976, at 
2B (―Florida voters agreed Tuesday to give up their power to elect new members of the Supreme 
Court and district courts of appeal as they ratified the so-called merit-retention amendment by a 
margin of better than 2-1.‖). 
3
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The judicial article of the Florida constitution succinctly addresses 
judicial retention: ―If a majority of the qualified electors voting within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court vote to retain, the justice or judge shall 
be retained for a term of six years.‖10 Accordingly, with respect to judicial 
retention, the November 2012 ballot will read substantially as follows: 
―Shall Justice (or Judge) . . . (name of justice or judge) . . . of the . . . (name 
of the court) . . . be retained in office?‖11  
To place the current system in context, a review of the history of 
Florida judicial selection is warranted.
12
 As indicated below, judicial 
selection in Florida has evolved over time and has taken multiple forms 
prior to the current system. 
B.  History of Judicial Selection in Florida
 
Florida’s first constitution was adopted by convention in 1838 and 
became effective upon statehood in 1845.
13
 Under the 1838 constitution, 
all judges except justices of the peace were elected by ―the concurrent vote 
of a majority of both Houses of the General Assembly.‖14 There were two 
important subsequent changes to the system under the 1838 constitution. In 
1851, the legislature established an independent supreme court whose three 
members would be elected by the legislature to eight-year terms.
15
 And in 
1852, the constitution was amended to increase voters’ role in judicial 
selection.
16
 With this amendment, circuit court judges were elected for six-
year terms.
17
 
In contrast to using the popular vote as the mechanism for selecting 
judges, the Florida constitution of 1865 required supreme court justices to 
―be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.‖18 Then, in 1868, the adoption of a new constitution again changed 
                                                                                                                     
 10. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Balanced treatment of the subject of judicial merit retention in Florida necessarily 
requires reference to the current system of judicial selection. Merit selection and merit retention are 
integral parts of a single policy and must be considered together. Notably, merit retention elections 
for supreme court justices and state appellate judges only occur after judges have been selected 
through the judicial nominating commission process and have served at least one year. See FLA. 
CONST. art. V, § 11(a). In contrast, candidates for open seats on the county and circuit courts are 
elected by popular vote by registered voters in the particular county or circuit. See id. § 10(b). If a 
county court or circuit court seat becomes vacant during a judge’s term, that vacancy is filled 
through the judicial nominating commission process. See id. § 11(b). 
 13. See Joseph W. Little, An Overview of the Historical Development of the Judicial Article 
of the Florida Constitution, 19 STETSON L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
 14. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. V, § 11. 
 15. See Little, supra note 13, at 6. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. V, § 10. However, voters still elected circuit judges. See id. 
§ 11. The legislature was also empowered to establish an elected chancery court. See id. § 13. 
4
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several aspects of judicial selection.
19
 First, county courts were established, 
with county court judges appointed by the governor and confirmed by the 
senate to serve four-year terms.
20
 Second, circuit court judges were 
appointed by the governor for eight-year terms, thus eliminating popular 
elections as the mechanism for selecting circuit court judges.
21
 Third, 
supreme court justices, who were still appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the senate, now held ―their offices for life or during good 
behavior.‖22 
The Florida constitution of 1885 introduced yet another approach to 
judicial selection.
23
 The 1885 constitution gave voters the ability to elect 
supreme court justices
24
 and county judges
25
 but reserved the selection of 
circuit court judges to the governor, through gubernatorial appointment 
subject to confirmation by the senate.
26
 The evolution of Florida’s judicial 
system, from gubernatorial appointments, to general elections, to joint 
governor–senate selections, continued well into the twentieth century.27 In 
1942, Florida’s constitution was amended to restore elections for circuit 
court judges, beginning with the 1948 elections.
28
 In 1956, the judicial 
article was completely revised to create the district courts of appeal.
29
 
II.  JUDICIAL REFORM: THE INSTITUTION OF MERIT RETENTION IN 
FLORIDA 
Florida’s transition to merit selection and retention was part of a larger 
effort to reform judicial selection in the states. Professor Albert Kales of 
Northwestern University School of Law proposed merit selection and 
retention as an alternative to judicial elections, which he thought had 
become politicized.
30
 Professor Kales’s proposal provided for appointment 
by an elected chief justice, but it also required appointed judges to stand 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Little, supra note 13, at 9–14. 
 20. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 9. 
 21. Id. § 7. 
 22. Id. § 3. 
 23. See Little, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
 24. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 2. 
 25. Id. § 16. 
 26. Id. § 8. 
 27. See generally Raquel A. Rodriguez, Judicial Selection in Florida—An Executive Branch 
Perspective, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2005, at 16–19. As analyzed by Raquel Rodriguez, former General 
Counsel to Governor Jeb Bush, the various evolving modifications to judicial selection in Florida 
derived generally from the policy goal of seeking to establish a system for selecting judges that 
would promote an independent and impartial judicial branch. 
 28. See Little, supra note 13, at 23. 
 29. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V (1956). 
 30. See G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 608–09 (2009); 
see also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178, 186 (1937) (―Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges 
to become politicians . . . has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the Bench.‖). 
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for retention elections.
31
 A similar system was instituted in Missouri, but 
instead of the chief justice making appointments, the governor appointed 
judges from a list of candidates submitted to him by a commission.
32
 This 
system spread to other states in the South, the Great Plains, and the 
Rockies.
33
 
In 1971, Florida Governor Reubin Askew began implementing such a 
judicial selection system in the hopes that it would encourage the nonpartisan 
review of judicial nominees on the basis of merit.
34
 By executive order, 
Governor Askew established a framework to fill judicial vacancies through 
the creation of judicial nominating councils.
35
 Initially each council was 
composed of six active members of The Florida Bar, three appointed by the 
governor and three appointed by The Florida Bar.
36
 Those six Bar members 
then jointly selected three citizens to join the council.
37
 Each nine-member 
council then had the responsibility of nominating candidates to the 
governor to fill judicial vacancies.
38
 
Under the 1971 executive order, however, the governor retained full 
discretion over whether to appoint any of the judicial nominees presented 
by the Judicial Nominating Councils.
39
 In 1972, Floridians voted to amend 
the Florida constitution to curtail this gubernatorial discretion.
40
 
Specifically, Florida voters amended the Constitution to require the 
governor to appoint ―one of not fewer than three persons nominated.‖41 
In 1976, Floridians again voted to amend the Florida constitution 
regarding the selection and retention of judges and justices. Under the 1976 
amendment, the authority of nominating commissions was increased when 
Floridians voted to end the general elections for both appellate court judges 
and supreme court justices.
42
 Thus, the 1976 constitutional amendment 
placed the appellate courts and the supreme court under the judicial 
nomination process and instituted the current system of nonpartisan 
judicial merit retention elections for retaining judges on those courts.
43
 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Albert M. Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, 11 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y 133, 141–43 (1927) (outlining proposed procedures for merit selection and retention). 
 32. See Blackmar, supra note 3, at 200–02; Tarr, supra note 30, at 609. 
 33. See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA ch. 10 (2012) (describing the spread of merit selection and retention). 
 34. See R. Stanley Lowe, Voluntary Merit Retention Plans, 55 JUDICATURE 161, 166–67 
(1971) (describing efforts in Florida and other states to implement voluntary merit selection for 
judicial vacancies through executive decision). 
 35. Id. at 166. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 167. 
 39. See Rodriguez, supra note 27, at 16, 17. 
 40. Id. at 17. 
 41. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1972). 
 42. Id. § 10(a) (1976). 
 43. See Rodriguez, supra note 27, at 17. 
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With this amendment, candidates for judgeships on Florida’s appellate 
courts no longer campaigned for office and no longer collected political 
contributions like candidates for representative office. Political 
campaigning for positions on the appellate courts and the supreme court 
thus ended when Floridians took steps to seemingly insulate the system of 
judicial selection and retention from electoral politics.
44
 
It is important to remember that this constitutional amendment 
emerged during a time the Florida Supreme Court was plagued with 
scandal.
45
 As a result of the 1976 constitutional amendment, the system 
initiated by Governor Askew’s executive order in the early 1970s—
whereby the governor reserved full discretionary power in appointing 
judges—was synthesized with the new judicial nominating commissions. 
The current system has therefore operated since first being implemented in 
1978 and has functioned under seven governors, both Democrats and 
Republicans.
46
 
Today, the system implemented by Floridians through the 1976 
amendment emphasizes judicial selection through nonpartisan 
considerations of merit at two junctures. First, after applicants for judicial 
office are vetted on the basis of merit by nonpartisan judicial nominating 
commissions, the governor is required to appoint ―one of not fewer than 
three persons nor more than six persons nominated by the appropriate 
judicial nominating commission.‖47 Second, following the initial review, in 
the first election after a newly appointed judge has served for at least one 
year and every six years thereafter, voters cast ballots in nonpartisan 
elections to determine, on the basis of judicial merit, whether to retain a 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Nineteen states currently use retention elections to retain at least some sitting judges. See 
generally Judicial Selection in the States, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us 
(last visited July 5, 2012) (collecting information about judicial selection and retention). Even amid 
limited changes and opposition, the merit retention system in Florida has remained intact. 
Significantly, ―[n]o state that has chosen the merit system has ever given it up.‖ Merit Selection and 
Retention, THE FLA. BAR, http://www.floridabar.org (search for ―merit selection‖; then follow 
―Board Issue Paper—Merit Selection and Retention‖ hyperlink) (last visited July 5, 2012). 
 45. See generally MARTIN A. DYCKMAN, A MOST DISORDERLY COURT: SCANDAL AND REFORM 
IN THE FLORIDA JUDICIARY (2007) (detailing a series of high-profile scandals that rocked the Florida 
judiciary in the 1970s and prompted judicial reforms). 
 46. There have been attempts to modify Florida’s current system. In 2001, House Joint 
Resolution 627 and House Bill 367 were proposed in an attempt to regain much of the authority for 
judicial selection that had been lost by the executive and legislative branches. Then-President of 
The Florida Bar Herman Russomanno concluded that the proposed resolution would ―remove all 
checks on the politicization of judicial selection, place incumbent judges at the whim of the 
legislature or any group of persons dissatisfied with a particular decision, and significantly reduce 
the independence of the judiciary.‖ Herman J. Russomanno, An Independent Bar and Judiciary: As 
American As Baseball and Apple Pie, 75 FLA. B.J. 4, 4–6 (2001). President Russomanno expressed 
concern about the proposal, saying, ―this bill would completely politicize a judicial selection 
process that was intentionally set up to ensure balance and greater impartiality within the judicial 
nominating commissions.‖ Id. at 6. 
 47. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11. 
7
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judge in office.
48
 
III.  CHALLENGES FACING VOTERS WHEN ASSESSING JUDICIAL MERIT 
As previously noted, recent focus group research conducted on behalf 
of The Florida Bar indicates that 90% of voters lack an understanding of 
judicial merit retention.
49
 Given this deficiency in understanding, The 
Florida Bar Board of Governors initiated a voter education program 
directed to the dissemination of basic information on judicial merit 
selection.
50
 A central issue, however, is trying to understand more broadly 
the reasons for the lack of voter understanding. The analysis of this topic, 
no doubt, would benefit from empirical research. However, based on 
comments raised in various public forums, the following appear to be 
important considerations. 
A.  Limited Understanding of Judicial Role 
Understanding the important role that judges play in our democracy 
and how judges perform their work is a significant challenge for voters. 
Based on opinions expressed in public forums, there appear to be varying 
degrees of voter understanding about the roles and functions of a judge. 
For example, voters often show a lack of understanding when asked how 
they would weigh disputed facts in light of an evidentiary burden of proof 
or when considering that appellate judges are generally limited in their 
review to matters contained in the lower court record and to the issues 
properly preserved for appeal.
51
 The voters’ limited appreciation for the 
difficult work of judging applies to all levels of the judiciary: to trial judges 
in county and circuit courts; to appellate judges in the five district courts of 
appeal; and to justices on the Florida Supreme Court. 
In the context of judicial merit retention, however, having a basic 
understanding of what judges do, and what functions judges perform, is 
important when considering the question of how voters assess judicial 
merit. In the end, the policy underlying judicial merit retention elections—
as a mechanism for determining whether judges merit continuation in 
office—is grounded in part on the premise that voters will cast votes in 
favor of retaining or not retaining a particular judge based on the citizen’s 
assessment of the merit of that particular judge. If voters lack an 
understanding of what judges do, then how can voters actually assess the 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. § 10.  
 49. See Moore Consulting Grp., supra note 4. 
 50. See The Vote‟s in Your Court, supra note 2. 
 51. For example, following a well-publicized trial in Florida, a resident sought my view as 
President of the Bar about the State’s failure to obtain a guilty verdict. I responded by asking if that 
person had ever tried to prove a fact ―beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ The inquirer initially seemed 
puzzled, but then the conversation turned to sanctity of the burden of proof that under the United 
States Constitution governs a criminal proceeding. 
8
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merits of a particular judge? Further complicating the matter, judges are 
not permitted in our system to explain their rulings or defend how they 
arrived at a particular ruling. Therefore,  the electorate does not have an 
ability to question judicial candidates on prior rulings. Instead, the voters 
are left to decipher a judge’s merit through their own readings, 
communications with others, and the media. 
B.  The Role of a Judge on a Retention Ballot Differs from that of a 
Candidate for Representative Office 
Another challenge voters face arises from the fundamental difference 
between judges and representative officeholders such as members of 
Congress or state legislators. Evidence of the distinctions is borne out in 
the campaigns of those seeking judicial office and those seeking 
representative office. In American democracy, voters are conditioned to 
vote for candidates based on name recognition and political positions. For 
example, when running for Congress, a candidate will endeavor to broadly 
communicate his name in the pertinent media markets in the hopes of 
attracting votes through name recognition. Likewise, a candidate for the 
state legislature will enunciate policy positions—in the form of campaign 
promises and platforms—in hopes of stimulating voter interest, campaign 
contributions, and ultimately election-day support. These factors, in part, 
represent the voter mindset when considering how to support a particular 
candidate. Voters are conditioned to expect candidates to proceed in this 
manner. However, in considering candidate behavior, it is important to 
note that the roles and functions judges perform are fundamentally 
different than the roles and functions representative public officials 
perform. Likewise, unlike candidates for representative office, candidates 
for judicial office are restricted by severe campaign limitations, as 
discussed below. Nevertheless, both are subject to voter approval through 
an election process. 
As noted by one commentator when comparing judges with candidates 
for representative office: ―Judges are different because they cannot be 
advocates, they cannot have political agendas, and in many instances, once 
a judge makes a determination of the facts, that judge has no choice as to 
what law to apply.‖52 In contrast, elected public officials, sensitive to their 
political support, legislate and govern based on partisan philosophy. Stated 
differently, while judges interpret and apply the law, legislatures debate 
and enact the law. While legislatures are bound by the support of the 
people, judges are yoked to the confines of the law. 
In analyzing the differing roles between judges and representative 
office holders, Alexander Hamilton noted, ―The courts must declare the 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Ben F. Overton, Senior Justice, Retired, Fla. Supreme Court, Remarks at the Hillsborough 
County Debate on Merit Selection and Merit Retention, Tampa, Fla. 9 (Nov. 2, 1999) (transcript on 
file with author). 
9
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sense of the law, and if they should be disposed to exercise will instead of 
judgment,‖ the legislature and the judiciary would cease to be distinct.53 
And the traits that make a good judge are quite different from the traits that 
make a good legislator. These important distinctions between judges and 
representative public officials, however, are often misunderstood, and may 
be difficult for some voters to comprehend, especially when they hear 
high-profile comments characterizing some judges as political activists.
54
 
C.  Limitations on Judicial Campaigns 
Another challenge for voters in the context of assessing judicial merit 
pertains to campaign limitations on candidates for judicial office. Due to 
campaign restrictions and the nature of judicial office, the campaign of a 
candidate for judicial office differs substantially from the campaign of a 
candidate for representative office. Specifically, judicial candidates are 
prohibited from announcing personal or political views.
55
  Since judges 
cannot self-promote, efforts to generate name recognition and political 
donations are impeded. Further, judicial candidates are nonpartisan and 
may not enunciate opinions about potential rulings. 
The notion that judicial candidates cannot express policy views, or that 
judicial candidates are limited in what they can do to differentiate themselves 
from one another, contradicts voters’ expectations. While voters expect 
candidates for office to express their views on policy issues such as taxes 
and defense, candidates for judicial office are limited on expressing such 
views. These limitations embody the goal that courts should be led by fair 
and impartial judges and should be independent of the executive and 
legislative branches. Impartiality could vanish if judges are permitted to 
express their policy views or indicate how they might rule on particular 
issues. 
In contrast to the severe campaign limitations imposed on judges, few 
restrictions limit the efforts of groups opposed to their retention. As noted, 
the efforts of opposition groups whose ―aim is usually not merely to punish 
a particular justice but to send a message to other justices‖ can invest 
resources in the election which ―affect the orientation and decisions of the 
court.‖56 Therefore, ―retention elections have the same potential for 
                                                                                                                     
 53. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 54. See, e.g., Amy Gardner & Matt DeLong, Newt Gingrich‟s Assault on „Activist Judges‟ 
Draws Criticism, Even from Right, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2011), available at http://www.washingto 
npost.com/politics/newt-gingrichs-assault-on-activist-judges-draws-criticism-even-from-right/2011/ 
12/17/gIQAoYa80O_story.html.  
 55. Some restrictions on political speech by judges have come under constitutional challenge. 
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); see also Michael Richard Dimino, 
Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges‟ Political Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53 (2006). 
 56. G. Alan Tarr, State Judicial Selection and Judicial Independence, in JUSTICE IN 
JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY 
JUDICIARY app. D at 5 (2003). 
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intimidation and a chilling effect on judicial decision making as direct 
election.‖57 Voters must be wary of interest group involvement in the 
upcoming retention election because it has the power to ―[transform] those 
elections into races virtually indistinguishable from partisan contests.‖58 As 
noted by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, judicial selection does not take 
place in a void; rather, ―the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of 
men [seeking political office] do not turn aside in their course and pass the 
judges by.‖59 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF VOTER EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE 
FLORIDA BAR 
Mindful of the challenges voters face in casting an informed vote in 
judicial retention elections, the Florida Bar Board of Governors launched a 
public education program in an attempt to enhance voter understanding on 
this important subject.
60
 Branded The Vote‟s in Your Court, the public 
education program is designed to educate Florida voters about the merit 
retention process and to urge voters to make informed decisions when 
casting their ballots to retain appellate judges and supreme court justices in 
November 2012.
61
 The program urges voters to carefully evaluate judges 
based on merit as represented by their reputations for ability, commitment, 
scholarship, ethics, diligence, demeanor, and treatment of colleagues and 
those who appear before them.
62
 Further, the program urges voters to 
weigh a judge’s full body of work and record of accomplishment.63 
Voters are urged to check the truth of circulated opinions and to be 
mindful of the importance of a ―judge’s professional qualifications‖64 amid 
the ―constructed political coalitions‖65 that will mount opposition—such 
efforts often mirroring ―the coalitions formed for other partisan political 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming 
History, Elections, and Misperceptions about the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817, 
859 (1998). 
 58. Tarr, supra note 56, at 4. 
 59. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
 60. See The Vote‟s in Your Court, supra note 2. The Florida Bar’s efforts to educate voters are 
especially important given the high visibility of this year’s retention elections. One study showed 
that following a high-visibility judicial campaign more voters participated in the election but those 
voters were less informed about their choices. See Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses 
to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, 
AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 160–61 (Matthew L. Streb ed., 2007). 
 61. See The Vote‟s in Your Court, supra note 2. 
 62. See THE FLA. BAR, GUIDE FOR FLORIDA VOTERS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT 
FLORIDA JUDGES, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND MERIT RETENTION (2012), available at http://www.florid 
abar.org/thevotesinyourcourt (follow ―Florida Bar Guide for Florida Voters‖ hyperlink). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Tarr, supra note 56, at 4. 
 65. Id.  
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disputes.‖66 While voters receive information about judges and their work 
from a variety of sources, ultimately voters must decide for themselves, 
based on the facts and their own judgment, whether those judges deserve to 
be retained in office. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial retention elections have emerged as a product of various 
movements with the same apparent goals: establishing, maintaining, and 
promoting an impartial and independent judiciary. By constitutional 
amendment, voters established Florida’s judicial merit retention system in 
1976. The merit retention system has functioned uniformly in Florida since 
that time under seven different governors, both Democrats and Republicans.  
The November 2012 general election could prove to be a pivotal test 
for merit retention in Florida given the number of justices and appellate 
judges on the ballot. As discussed in this Essay, merit retention elections 
present special challenges for voters entrusted with assessing the merits of 
particular judges. This difficulty, in part, stems from the complicated roles  
judges fulfill in our democracy and the limitations placed on judicial 
campaigning. To address the lack of voter understanding, The Florida Bar 
has engaged in a public education effort to enhance voter understanding. 
The Florida Law Review is commended for undertaking scholarly 
consideration of this important topic. 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. 
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